

Securing Mobile CPSs against Stealthy Attacks

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<http://cs.txstate.edu/~mgb5/mcps>



Motivation:

- Mobile Cyber-Physical Systems (Mobile CPSs) will be pervasively integrated into our physical world
- How to ensure the security and safety of Mobile CPSs?

Challenges:


- Reliance on wireless technology
 - Easy to jam and interfere with
- Complexity with real-time, energy and mobility constraints
 - Widens the malicious opportunities
- Attacks are not “random noise”, but are well orchestrated
 - Studies that focus on random noise and disturbance do not apply

Scope of work:


- Identifying stealthy attacks
- Developing defense mechanisms



[European Commission- swarmanoid]



[UT- Multi-agent systems]




[MIT- Smart Sand]

Methodology: Identifying Stealthy Attacks


• Markov Decision Process

- State of the system
- Transitions



• Offense strategy


- Aims to evolve the system into “bad” states (Z)
- Pays a price when attacks
- Gains a reward when inflicts damage
- Identifies policies that maximize the cumulative rewards



$$\max_{\mu_1, \mu_2, \dots} E \left[\sum_{k=1}^T R(k) | I_k \right]$$

• Exact Policy Iteration

- Optimal policies can be obtained
- Value determination: expected cost-to-go values are computed
- Policy improvement: a better policy is generated




• The curse of dimensionality:

- Large state space makes it computationally infeasible to obtain exact solutions [Bellman]

• Approximate Policy Iteration


- Relies on Monte Carlo simulations
- Characterizes states based on a set of feature
- Uses a parametric cost-to-go approximation for the value function [Bertsekas]



Stuck in Traffic (Sit) Attacks on Intelligent Transportation Systems

• The setup

- Decision points reflect loads on segments
- Drivers make informed decisions
- Attackers aims to cause congestion



• Scenarios


- Traffic optimization

• Damage

- Degree of imbalance

• Cost

- Number of vehicles affected




<http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.5454>

Stealthy Attacks on Target Tracking Applications

• The setup

- Target moves randomly
- Agent seeks to find the target
- Attacker aims to hinder tracking



• Scenarios


- Search and rescue
- Border control

• Damage

- Distance between the agent and the target
- Negative if target is found

• Cost

- Different values for control and measurement signals



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Interested in meeting the PIs? Attach post-it note below!



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