

BANDWIDTH STEALING VIA LINK-TARGETED ROQ ATTACKS

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ABSTRACT

We present a scheme that enables a set of flows to acquire an unfair share of bandwidth by mounting an adversarial distributed Reduction of Quality (RoQ) attack on flows competing for that bandwidth. This adversarial behavior stands in sharp contrast to other network exploits, *e.g.*, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, whose aim is to simply take down a resource, or severely limit access to a service. The extent to which the scheme we expose is successful in slowing down competing flows determines the amount of “stolen bandwidth.” We present two schemes for the construction of a RoQ attack stream that would evade detection, and thus would challenge counter-DoS techniques. Our results show the vulnerability of the Internet to the distributed nature of RoQ attacks, which could be mounted through a relatively small number of zombie clients, motivating the need for the development of counter measures. We validate our findings through simple analysis, simulations and real Internet experiments.

KEY WORDS

Internet Security; Denial of Service; TCP; Performance Evaluation.

1 Introduction

Denial of Service (DoS) [1] and Distributed DoS (DDoS) [2] attacks have become a major threat for almost every Internet service. Recently, MyDoom crashed SCO Group’s web site through launching a DDoS attack that involved 100K-200K zombies; MyDoom had cost the global economy over \$26.1B [3]. Having compromised that huge number of zombie clients, the possibilities for different kinds of damage are abound.

This paper exposes a distributed attack targeting a set of Internet links, with the explicit purpose of enabling a particular set of flows to acquire more than their fair share of bandwidth, in effect “stealing” that bandwidth from other flows. The scheme we present leverages a distributed version of our recently exposed Reduction of Quality (RoQ) attacks [4] to achieve a goal that stands in sharp contrast to traditional adversarial attacks, which are designed just for the sake of shutting off some flows [5] or crashing a particular service [6]. We refer to the set of flows that are beneficiaries of our “bandwidth stealing” scheme as the *supported flows*. By mounting a distributed RoQ attack on a carefully selected set of links, flows that compete for bandwidth (on the bottleneck of supported flows) are throttled. We refer to such competing flows as the




Figure 1. Bandwidth Stealing Scheme

victimized flows. As a result of the distributed RoQ attack, supported flows are able to claim more than their fair share of the bottleneck bandwidth—in effect stealing such bandwidth from victimized flows. We refer to the targets of the distributed RoQ attack as the *target links*. Clearly, target links are traversed by victimized flows, but not by supported flows.

When supported flows share an Internet link with other flows, they get their fair-share of resources as would be allocated by the widely used Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [7]. As more bandwidth becomes available, TCP’s probing mechanism through its additive-increase would enable flows to utilize such bandwidth, keeping the network operating at high utilization. At the same time, experiencing packet losses would trigger TCP’s multiplicative-decrease where the window is halved to alleviate congestion.

The RoQ attacks that we envision would cause competing flows to experience different levels of packet losses. Hence, their throughput would decrease, limited by the damage as opposed to their network fair-share, yielding a slack that would be naturally acquired by supported flows, causing them to get more than their true fair share. As discussed later, depending on the feasibility of the attack in terms of identifying potential target links and in terms of the magnitude of the attack, different bandwidth allocations could be (illegitimately) provided to the set of supported flows.

Figure 1 depicts our envisioned setup; we assume the presence of a number of zombie clients scattered around the globe. These clients are controlled by an attack controller.¹

¹Zombie machines are usually compromised by a virus or a worm. It is

An entity responsible for a set of flows illegitimately requests the aid of an attacker, possibly through out-of-band communication, providing the attack controller with the Internet path that the set of supported flows are traversing. The attack controller, in return, would broadcast such information to zombie clients, which in turn could run an inference algorithm that enable them to identify a set of potential target links for RoQ attacks. Figure 1 depicts one of possibly many scenarios where the supported flows are traversing the path $A - B - C - D$ between Alice and Bob. The bottleneck link in this case is BC and the throughput between Alice and Bob is limited by the fair-share given at the bottleneck link. The zombie clients would then identify links EB and CF as potential target links. Launching RoQ attacks on links EB and CF , would limit the achievable throughput for flows on those links, causing Alice and Bob to receive more than their fair share of resources on link BC . It is worth mentioning that it could be the case that no target links could be identified by the zombies, hence the attack is not carried out. We will present simple analysis showing that the probability of this happening is very low, providing a lower bound on the required number of zombie clients.

Evading detection is one of the most important challenges faced by the attack controller as well as by zombie clients; we identify two possible schemes for evading detection. Such schemes rely on generating fairly low intensity (but well orchestrated) traffic per attack stream. Doing so ensures that the low-intensity attack traffic is not detected by regular counter-DoS techniques. More to the point, detecting RoQ attacks is challenging because such attacks do not cause a complete denial of service on the target links, but rather, they aim to limit the bandwidth grabbed by the victimized flows.

Paper Outline: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our scheme in details. Performance evaluation is presented through simulations and real Internet experiments in Section 3. We revisit related work in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 Attack Orchestration

2.1 RoQ Attack Construction

End-system protocols (*e.g.*, TCP) rely on feedback mechanisms to adapt their sending rates to match their “fair share” of network resources. TCP reduces its sending rate on packet loss/marketing and increases its rate on successful packet transmission. Typically, the decrease in rate, which is needed to protect against congestion collapse, is drastic—*e.g.*, by halving the sending rate—whereas the increase in rate, which is needed to probe for available bandwidth, is slow—*e.g.*, by linearly increasing the sending rate over time. Additive-Increase-Multiplicative-Decrease (AIMD) rules² ensure that flows react adequately to congestion in a “friendly” manner to one another—hence the TCP-friendly label [9]. Moreover, these protocols react even more swiftly to excessive losses by completely shutting off their sending rates for a long period of time

outside the scope of this paper to describe how such a setup could be achieved; it suffices to note that recent attacks [2] are all carried out using similar setups.

²Other TCP-friendly increase/decrease rules have also been proposed and evaluated [8]. All would be susceptible with various degrees to the same issues we consider in this paper.

(*e.g.*, timing out in TCP).

The adaptation strategies of transmission control protocols such as TCP, while crucial for alleviating congestion, make them vulnerable to losses that are generated through other processes—namely losses that are not the result of persistent congestion (*e.g.*, wireless losses). The impact of such losses on TCP performance was considered in many studies; examples include [10]. In these studies, however, the processes interfering with TCP’s adaptation could be considered “non adversarial” in the sense that the losses were more or less the result of (say) a random process as opposed to a calculated attack. Indeed, in recent work, it was shown that an attacker could potentially shut off the communication between two parties (*e.g.*, Alice and Bob) by mounting what is termed as a “shrew” attack [5]—an attack that exploits TCP’s time-out mechanism, which is how TCP adapts to persistent congestion.

As we hinted in the introduction and as the results in this paper will demonstrate, illegitimately giving a particular set of flows additional bandwidth doesn’t require a complete shut-off of the competing flows, but rather only *limiting* their achievable throughput. Hence, launching a “shrew” attack would be an over-kill, not to mention the suspicious behavior it may cause as victim flows cannot send any packets across the network. We consider a RoQ attack comprising a burst of M packets (or bytes) transmitted at the rate of δ packets (or bytes) per second over a short period of time τ , where $M = \delta\tau$. This process is repeated every T units of time. We call M the *magnitude* of the attack, δ the *amplitude* of the attack, τ the *duration* of the attack, and T the *period* of the attack. Typically τ should be much smaller than T . Thus the RoQ attack traffic, $I(t)$, at time t is given by:

$$I(t) = \begin{cases} \delta & t \bmod T \leq \tau \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Such a square-wave attack traffic is advantageous to an attacker in two ways: First, it provides the freedom of varying attack parameters (δ , τ and T) causing different levels of damage. Second, it allows the zombies’ traffic to go unnoticed by having an average attack traffic of $\frac{M}{T}$ that is much lower than the peak rate δ . This gives one degree of freedom to evade detection. A second degree of freedom is addressed in the next subsection, where the traffic $\frac{M}{T}$ would be distributed across different attack streams.

It is worth mentioning that the same AIMD mechanism that RoQ attacks exploit, *is* the one that allows supported flows to take advantage of available bandwidth once victimized flows back-off.

2.2 Selecting the Targeted links

We now turn our attention to how RoQ attack traffic could be routed through the network. In particular, how could zombie clients identify potential target links through which they should send their traffic. Potential target links are those more likely to carry traffic competing with supported flows. Figure 2 depicts a more detailed view of Figure 1, where Alice and Bob are communicating through the path $A - B - C - D$ and are limited by their fair-share at link BC .




Figure 2. Detailed view of the adversarial bandwidth stealing scheme we consider.

Figure 2 shows a subset of four potential target links (GB , EB , CF and CH) that could carry traffic through link BC . Notice that the problem of identifying those potential target links is the same as discovering the neighborhoods (and interfaces) of the bottleneck routers. We present a three-step algorithm that would allow zombie clients to discover the area around each router with high probability. Then, we give a lower bound on the number of zombie clients that would cause a complete discovery of the neighborhood.

Initially, each zombie client receives the common path traversed by supported flows from the attack controller. For ease of presentation, we assume they only receive the IP addresses of both routers along the path of supported flows that represent the bottleneck link. In the first step of our algorithm, each zombie client would trace the route to those two routers. This will lead to the discovery of those routers along the path between the zombies and the two initial routers. This step corresponds to the discovery of routers E , F , G and H in Figure 2. In particular, zombie $Z1$ would know about E and F , while zombie $Z2$ would know about G and H . We refer to this list of routers as the “previous-hop” list.

In the second step, zombie clients exchange their “previous-hop” lists. Through exchanging these lists, each side of the zombies would know about the routers located on the other side of the bottleneck link. Exchanging these lists is made possible through the attack controller. Decentralized approaches are also feasible but would require more work from the zombie clients. This step corresponds to the discovery of routers E and F by zombie $Z2$ and routers G and H by zombie $Z1$ as illustrated in Figure 2.

The third and final step is another traceroute, now to the opposite side (e.g. zombie $Z2$ traceroutes to routers E and F), to remove any paths that contain any segment over which the supported flows traverse. Thus avoiding a scenario where the attack traffic is traversing along the same paths as the supported flows. The destination to be used for the attack traffic could be any valid IP address that belongs to a target router. For example, zombie $Z2$ sends its attack traffic to router F as illustrated in Figure 2. Given that some flow(s) competing with the supported flows and traversing CF back-off due to losses from the attack, the supported flows can then acquire their bandwidth. In practice, the longer the path of the sup-




Figure 3. Lower bound N^- for different probabilities and degrees 4 and 8 using uniform distribution.

ported flows, the more chances zombie clients have to identify potential target links.

Notice that an obvious attack is to send RoQ attack traffic directly to bottleneck routers. However, this would result in overloading those routers as they would have to process these attack packets rather than simply forwarding them, thus negatively impacting the performance of supported flows. The above inference algorithm targets links that are not on the path of the supported flows.

2.3 A Lower Bound on Zombies

Having described what constitutes a distributed RoQ attack and how its constituent traffic is routed through the network, we show that such attacks are feasible with a small number of zombies. Let the number of zombies be denoted by N and assume that there is only one router with degree d that we would like to discover its neighborhood (i.e. the d adjacent routers). We are interested in finding the minimum number of zombies that would cause the discovery of the d neighbors with high probability. In particular, the probability of missing an interface after N traceroutes from the N zombies,³ assuming uniform distribution among the router’s d neighbors, is given by:

$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{d}\right)^N \approx e^{-\frac{N}{d}} \quad (2)$$

Fixing the above probability to α , a lower bound on N , N^- is given by:

$$N^- = -d \times \ln(\alpha) \quad (3)$$

For any distribution of traffic, equation (2) can be modified to:

$$\left(1 - P_{min}^d\right)^N \approx e^{-NP_{min}^d} \quad (4)$$

where P_{min}^d is the minimum probability over all d interfaces.

Figure 3 shows the lower bound N^- as a function of changing α , and degrees $d = 4$ and $d = 8$ assuming a uniform distribution among a router’s interfaces. One can see that even for

³Notice that this problem is the same as throwing M balls in K bins problem, hence the same analysis could be applied.




Figure 4. The two-link topology used in ns-2 simulation experiments.

a small probability of 1%, the minimum number of zombies is very small (less than 20 for the case of $d = 4$ and twice as much for $d = 8$).⁴

Going back to our second degree of freedom for evading detection—that of spoofing the sources’ and destinations’ IP addresses. Unlike traditional DoS, every attack traffic packet could be sent from a source to a different destination. Moreover, as long as they are known to be routed through the resource under attack, these destinations do not even have to be legitimate or live addresses. As far as a detection mechanism in the middle could tell, the packets going through are between different sources and destinations. All these packets could be produced by a single zombie client. Another possibility is to divide the attack magnitude over a few zombies. This would be less suspicious at the ingress link that the zombie is connected to. The drawback, however, is the need for the zombies to synchronize their attack traffic on target links.

3 Performance Evaluation

In this section, we present results from ns-2 [11] simulation experiments we conducted to assess the effect of DoS and RoQ attacks on other flows, for improving the bandwidth allocated to the supported flows. We then validate our simulation results through live Internet experiments performed inside our laboratory.

3.1 Simulations

Figure 4 depicts the topology under consideration. We have two links AB and BC of capacity 100 Mbps each. All links have a one-way propagation delay of 1 msec. A total of 20 FTP connections, with unlimited data to send, traverse the topology from A to C . We refer to these as the AC flows. In addition, two groups of 10 FTP connections each traverse exactly one of the links in the topology. We refer to these as the AB and BC flows. Sources as well as receivers of these FTP flows connect to the routers A , B and C through access links. RED is used as the queue management at the links AB and BC . We set RED’s minimum and maximum buffer thresholds to 50 and 120 packets, respectively. The weight parameter β was set to

⁴Notice that in Figure 3, the line corresponding to a degree d would represent the same lower bound on the number of zombies for any distribution of traffic over interfaces if the minimum probability across the interfaces is $P_{min}^d = \frac{1}{d}$.




Figure 5. Improvement in allocated bandwidth as the level of DoS attack increases.




Figure 6. Improvement in allocated bandwidth as τ changes for a fixed T of 0.5 and δ of 110 Mbps.

0.0001 and P_{max} was set to 0.1. The buffer size is chosen to be 250 packets at each link. All packets are 1,000 bytes in size. Since flows AC traverse two bottleneck links, they tend to have less throughput than flows AB and BC . We therefore adjusted the propagation delay on the access links so that all connections have the same round-trip time. The attack traffic traverses link BC . Our goal is to interfere with flows AC for an improved allocated bandwidth for flows AB .

Figure 5 represents our first experiment, where the attacking sources use regular sustained high-level DoS streams. One can see that the improvement in throughput allocated to flows AB increases linearly with the magnitude of the attack. Clearly, this is a feasible way to attack, but it has the drawback of sending a lot of attack traffic. It is worth mentioning that this form of attack still could evade detection using spoofed sources and destinations, but still it is not considered a low-rate attack.

Our next experiment improves the previous result significantly by using a RoQ (instead of a DoS) approach. We adjusted the attack period T to 0.5 seconds, the attack rate δ to 110 Mbps and we varied the attack duration τ from 0 (no RoQ attack is launched) to 90 msec. Figure 6 shows the effect of τ on the allocated throughput for flows AB . As τ increases, the bandwidth allocated to flows AB increases. Notice that doubling the bandwidth for flows AB from 31 Mbps to 60 Mbps




Figure 7. The five-link topology used in ns-2 experiments.

required a DoS attack with an average rate of 60 Mbps. However, for a τ value of 60 msec, the same bandwidth allocation was achieved for an average attack traffic of 11 Mbps. The attack traffic was reduced by almost a factor of 6.

We next turn our attention to a topological setting that would likely arise, in which zombie clients will be injecting RoQ attack streams on the ingress points of some router and the egress points of another router. Figure 7 depicts such a topology. We have five links AB , EB , BC , CD and CF of capacity 100 Mbps each. All links have a one-way propagation delay of 1 msec. A total of 20 FTP connections, with unlimited data to send, traverse the topology from A to D and from E to F . In addition, five groups of 10 FTP connections each traverse exactly one of the links in the topology. We refer to these as the AB , EB , BC , CD and CF flows. RED is used as the queue management on all the links and is parameterized as above. Sources as well as receivers of these FTP flows connect to the routers E , A , B , C , D and F through access links of propagation delay of 8 msec. We consider an attack whose goal is to improve the bandwidth allocated to BC flows, through interfering with flows AD and EF . The zombie clients, after running their inference algorithm, will discover the links AB , EB , CD and CF .




Figure 8. Throughput allocated to each of the BC flows.

Figure 8 shows the different bandwidth allocations to flows BC , from ID 1 to 10, as RoQ attacks were successful in identifying and hitting one link (AB), two links (AB and EB) and the four links (AB , EB , CD and CF). All attack traffic followed the same parameters of $\tau = 50$ msec, $\delta = 110$ and $T = 0.5$ sec. Two things to note here. First, when a RoQ attack was launched on link AB , the slack bandwidth was divided between the BC and the EF flows, thus the improvement is not very high (from a total of 15 Mbps under no attack to 22




Figure 9. Setup used in our Internet experiments

Mbps). Once the link EB is attacked, the improvement was much more pronounced (up to 43 Mbps). Second, the improvement from attacking the four links didn't buy us as much improvement as attacking two links (now BC flows can get up to 46 Mbps). This is due to hitting the same flows on two links. The total average attack traffic on any attacked link was around 9.5 Mbps. This means that having three zombies is enough to ensure that the attack traffic from each zombie consumes less than its resource fair-share, thus evading detection. This is because each 100 Mbps link, except for BC which is shared by 50 flows, is 100 Mbps shared by 30 flows, giving a fair share of 3.3 Mbps per flow.

3.2 Internet Experiments

Figure 9 depicts the setup we used for our Internet experiments. It consists of two routers ($R0$ and $R1$), a local content server ($S0$), four client machines ($C1$, $C2$, $C3$ and $C4$), a source of attack traffic (A_s) and a sink of attack traffic (A_k). The router's server-side interface is connected to a 100 Mbps switch that connects to the content server machine ($S0$) and the attack source (A_s). The router's client-side interface is connected to another 100 Mbps switch that connects it to the local subnet where client machines ($C1$, $C2$, and $C3$) and attack sink (A_k) reside. The network interface cards on all machines run at 100 Mbps except for the router's client-side interface, representing the bottleneck link, which runs at 10 Mbps. All machines run Linux RedHat version 2.4.20. The router uses iproute2 and tc [12] to run different packet scheduling disciplines. In all experiments, we used a packetized version of FIFO (called pfifo).

A client (C_i) is configured to request local data transfers from the local server $S0$. As described in Section 2, the attack source (A_s) injects UDP packets destined to sink (A_k)⁵ following the square wave pattern with parameters δ , τ and T .

In this experiment, each of the 4 clients opens a TCP connection to the server $S0$ for a total of 3 TCP flows traversing $R0$ and 4 TCP flows traversing $R1$. $R1$ was the bottleneck for all the flows. Consider that the TCP flow from $C4$ to $S0$ requests additional bandwidth from the attacker. This in return triggers a RoQ attack through $R0$ to cripple the other 3 TCP flows. Figure 10 shows how the throughput allocated between $C4$ and $S0$ improves once the attack is launched at time 60. This attack had a value of τ of 60 msec, T of 0.5 sec and δ of 9.5 Mbps. The average attack traffic was 0.6 Mbps.

⁵Unlike traditional DoS attacks, A_k is not the target of the attack, but rather a bystander which does not even have to be on-line (as long as packets destined to it are routed through the target of the attack—namely router $R0$).




Figure 10. Throughput allocated to connection $C4-S0$. Attack is launched at time 60 between A_s and A_k , parameterized by $\delta = 9.5$ Mbps, $\tau = 60$ msec and $T = 0.5$ sec. Average attack traffic passing through $R0$ is 0.6 Mbps

4 Related Work

DoS attacks [1, 6] and many variants thereof [13] could be characterized as targeting one dimension of a system's service quality—namely, its availability. There are a number of papers that classify various forms of DoS attacks; examples include [14, 15, 16]. In this paper, we have focused on attacks whose perpetrators are not focused on denying access, but rather on interfering with other competing flows. More importantly, in this paper, we have focused on harder-to-detect, low-intensity attacks, *i.e.*, with modest aggressiveness compared to DoS attacks. The “Shrew” attack proposed in [5] is an example of a low-intensity, harder to detect attack which is targeted at a subset of flows going through a network link, with the intention of shutting off these flows by synchronizing the attack traffic in such a way to cause these flows to perpetually timeout. For the purpose of this paper, the “shrew” attack would be an over-kill, not to mention the suspicious concern it may trigger as victim flows cannot send any packets across the network. Moreover, it can't be tuned to achieve different levels of damage. RoQ attacks [4] could be tuned, through adjusting the parameters, to cause the minimum damage possible for achieving its goal, that of providing additional bandwidth to a set of flows by stealing it from competing flows.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we have exposed an adversarial scheme capable of providing additional bandwidth to a particular set of flows by stealing it from competing flows. This was achieved by launching a distributed RoQ attack on links that carry competing flows. Our results show that such attacks could be orchestrated with a small number of zombie clients while evading detection. We believe that shedding light on such vulnerabilities and how they can be exploited is crucial as it motivates the need for the development of new mechanisms for detecting these new forms of distributed attacks.

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